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ABSTRACT
Algorithmic assurances from advanced autonomous systems assist
human users in understanding, trusting, and using such systems ap-
propriately. Designing these systems with the capacity of assessing
their own capabilities is one approach to creating an algorithmic
assurance. e idea of ‘machine self-condence’ is introduced
for autonomous systems. Using a factorization based framework
for self-condence assessment, one component of self-condence,
called ‘solver-quality’, is discussed in the context of Markov deci-
sion processes for autonomous systems. Markov decision processes
underlie much of the theory of reinforcement learning, and are com-
monly used for planning and decision making under uncertainty in
robotics and autonomous systems. A ‘solver quality’ metric is for-
mally dened in the context of decision making algorithms based on
Markov decisions processes. A method for assessing solver quality
is then derived, drawing inspiration from empirical hardness mod-
els. Finally, numerical experiments for an unmanned autonomous
vehicle navigation problem under dierent solver, parameter, and
environment conditions indicate that the self-condence metric
exhibits the desired properties. Discussion of results, and avenues
for future investigation are included.
1 INTRODUCTION
anks to advances in AI and machine learning, unmanned au-
tonomous physical systems (APS) are poised to tackle complex
decision making problems for high-consequence applications, such
as wilderness search and rescue, transportation, agriculture, re-
mote science, and space exploration. APS must be self-sucient
and make self-guided decisions about complex problems delegated
by users. Hence, APS that are taskable—able to translate high-level
commands into suitable processes for sensing, learning, reasoning,
communicating, and acting –must also be cognizant and knowledge-
rich–capable of reasoning about the capabilities and limitations
of their own processes, anticipating possible failures, and able to
recognize when they are operating incorrectly [6].
is work is motivated by the need to develop new computa-
tional strategies for assessing when an APS reaches its competency
boundaries. If computed and communicated correctly, such assess-
ments can provide users with clearer predictions of APS behavior
and understanding of actual APS capabilities. is can not only
allow APS to take initiatives to stay within its competency bound-
ary in untested situations, but also provide users/stakeholders with
assurances that allow them to properly calibrate trust in (and hence
make proper use of) intelligent APS [13].
ese properties are especially important for APS that must rely
heavily on non-deterministic algorithms for decision-making under
uncertainty, i.e. to eciently make approximate inferences with
imperfect models, learn from limited data, and execute potentially
risky actions with limited information. Whereas most relevant and
recent work on algorithmic introspection and meta-reasoning to
date has focused on outcome-based analyses for AI/learning agents
with narrow well-dened tasks, holistic process-based techniques
for algorithmic competency boundary self-assessment are needed
to accommodate broader classes of APS operating in complex, dy-
namic and uncertain real-world seings – whose computational
models and approximations are expected to break down in less
obvious/foreknown ways.
is paper presents and builds on a recently developed algo-
rithmic framework for computing and evaluating self-assessments
in APS that leads to shorthand metrics of machine self-condence.
Self-condence is dened as an APS’ perceived ability to achieve
assigned goals aer accounting for uncertainties in its knowledge
of the world, its own state, and its own reasoning and execution
abilities [2, 3, 22]. Algorithmic computation of self-condence is
strongly linked to model-based assessments of probabilities pertain-
ing to task outcomes and completion—but crucially goes further
to provide insight into how well an APS’s processes for decision-
making, learning, perception, etc. are matched to intended tasks
[11]. We argue that the short-hand insight provided by self-condence
assessments can serve as a transparent and decomposable/traceable
feedback signal to anticipate degraded, nominal, or enhanced APS
performance, and thereby can be used to calibrate user trust in APS
for uncertain task seings.
e main contributions of this paper include: 1) A formal de-
nition of ‘solver-quality’ which is one of several factors that make
up ‘self-condence’. Herein, solver-quality is presented as a metric
for assessing how competent an MDP solver is for a given task. 2)
Solver-quality is then derived borrowing inspiration from empirical
hardness models (EHMs [17]. 3) Solver-quality is then evaluated
using numerical experiments. e paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2 we further explore motivations and background for
self-condence, including concepts like trust between humans and
autonomous systems, and a useful example application. In Sec-
tion 3 Factorized Machine Self-Condence (FaMSeC) is introduced
and a framework outlined. At the end of Section 3 we turn our
aention to one of the FaMSeC factors, ‘Solver ality’, and outline
specic challenges and desiderata in the context of the broadly
useful family of Markov Decision Process (MDP)-based planners.
A learning-based technique for computing solver quality factors
in MDP-family planners is then derived in Section 4. In Section 5
we present results from numerical experiments for an unmanned
autonomous vehicle navigation problem. Finally we present con-
clusions in Section 6.
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2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
is section reviews several key concepts and related works which
set the stage for our proposed computational machine self-condence
framework. To make the concepts discussed throughout the paper
concrete and provide an accessible proof-of-concept testbed in later
sections, we also describe a motivating APS application example
inspired by ongoing research in unmanned robotic systems.
2.1 Autonomous Systems and User Trust
An APS is generally any physical agent comprised of a machine
controlled by some form of soware-based autonomy. Autonomy
denes the ability of the system to perform a complex set of tasks
with lile/no human supervisory intervention for extended periods
of time. is generally means that an APS has at least one or more
of the capabilities of an articially intelligent physical agent, i.e.
reasoning, knowledge representation, planning, learning, percep-
tion, motion/manipulation, and/or communication [13]. Despite
many popular myths and misconceptions, an APS always interacts
with a human user in some way [4]. at is, the aforementioned
capabilities are the means by which an APS achieves some intended
degree of self-suciency and self-directedness for tasks that are
delegated by a user in order to meet an ‘intent frame’ (desired set
of goals, plans, constraints, stipulations, and/or value statements)
[18]. ‘Transparency’ in this context thus shis primary concern
away from details of how exactly an APS accomplishes a task, to-
wards knowing whether an autonomous system can/cannot execute
the task per the user’s intent frame. In cases where users must re-
examine delegated tasks, the ability to interrogate an APS for details
related to how tasks would be executed or why tasks can/cannot
be completed become an important follow-on consideration for
transparency (i.e. on a need to know ‘drill-down’ basis).
is view naturally sets up several questions related to user trust
in autonomous systems. Trust denes a user’s willingness and se-
curity in depending on an APS to carry out a delegated set of tasks,
having taken into consideration its characteristics and capabilities.
We focus here on the problem of how an APS can be designed to
actively assist users in appropriately calibrating their trust in the
APS. As surveyed in [13], several broad classes of algorithmic assur-
ances for APS have been developed, where an assurance is dened
as any property or behavior that can serve to increase or decrease
a user’s trust. Good assurances are challenging to develop because
they must allow users to gain beer insight and understanding of
APS behaviors for eectively managing operations, without under-
mining autonomous operations or burdening users in the process.
Many assurance strategies, such as value alignment [7] (where an
APS adapts its behavioral objectives with a user’s intent frame via
interactive learning) and interpretable reasoning [20] (where algo-
rithmic capabilities for planning, learning, reasoning, etc. are made
accessible and easy to understand for non-expert users) put the
onus on the APS (and designers) to integrate naturally transparent
trust-calibrating behaviors into core system functionality. Other
strategies, such as those based on post hoc explanation for learning
and reasoning systems [16, 19] and data visualization [21], require
users to render their own judgments via processing of information
provided by the APS (possibly in response to specic user queries).
Indeed, while the full range of assurance design strategies for APS
have much in common with techniques for ensuring transparency
and accountability for more general AI and learning systems, as-
surances based on self-monitoring oer an especially promising
path for APS competency assessment.
2.2 Self-Monitoring and Self-Condence
State of the art machine learning and statistical AI methods have
ushered in major improvements to APS capabilities in recent years.
Yet, as these methods and capabilities continue to improve and nd
new high-consequence applications, resulting APS implementa-
tions are also becoming more complex, opaque and dicult for users
(as well as designers and certifying authorities) to fully comprehend.
In particular, for sophisticated APS characterized by uncertainty-
based reasoning and data-driven learning, it can become extremely
dicult to make precise predictions about APS behavior and perfor-
mance limits in noisy, untested, and ‘out of scope’ task conditions
with any degree of certainty. Formal verication and validation
tools could be used to tackle these issues at design time, but do not
provide assurances that can be readily conveyed to or understood
by (non-expert) users at run-time. It can thus be argued that the
task of assessing APS competency at run-time is in general so com-
plex and burdensome that it should also be delegated to the APS
itself.
is leads to consideration of algorithmic self-monitoring meth-
ods, e.g. for introspective reasoning/learning [9], fault diagno-
sis and computational meta-reasoning/meta-learning [8]. While
promising for a wide variety of applications, these methods depend
heavily on task outcome and performance assessments, and oen
require data intensive evaluations. As such, these methods are oen
best-suited to APS with narrow, well-dened, capabilities and few
computational resource constraints. However, many current and
future APS must operate in open-ended task seings in physical
environments with signicant computational limitations (due to
constrained platform size, weight, power, etc.). e interpretation
of ‘favorable vs. unfavorable’ task outcomes can also shi in subtle
yet signicant ways that may not be obvious to non-expert users,
i.e. depending on the interactions of designed APS capabilities and
task context (all of which may also change drastically over the
course of a given operational instance).
ese limitations motivate consideration of process-based assess-
ment techniques that allow APS to more generally self-qualify their
capabilities for a particular task by evaluating and reporting their
associated degree of ‘self-trust’ or self-condence. As evidenced by
recent work in neurocomputational modeling of decision-making
for visual-motor tasks, self-condence reporting in humans gener-
ally requires second-order reasoning about uncertainties associated
with particular task outcomes, i.e. assessments of ‘uncertainties in
uncertainty’ as well as of one’s own reasoning processes [1]. is
resonates with the machine self-condence concept put forth by
[11], who proposed using human expert evaluations of specic APS
capabilities to manually encode where and when these may break
down in particular tasking situations. Several formal denitions and
techniques for allowing APS to automatically compute their own
machine self-condence scores in the context of dierent tasks and
capability assessments have been proposed recently. For instance,
Kuter and Miller [15] proposed to evaluate plan stability for systems
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that rely on hierarchical task planning algorithms, using formal
counter-planning methods to determine threatening contingencies
for a given plan and plan repair techniques in order to assess the
adaptability of that plan to circumvent those contingencies. is
relies heavily on xed knowledge bases and ontologies, and so only
supports assessments for well-understood environments, tasks, sys-
tems, and contexts. ese and other approaches are reviewed in
[22], as well as in [13] in the context of algorithmic interactions
for human-autonomous system trust relationships. For the sake of
brevity, we restrict aention to the denition of self-condence used
in this work: An agent’s perceived ability to achieve assigned
goals (within a dened region of autonomous behavior) af-
ter accounting for (1) uncertainties in its knowledge of the
world, (2) uncertainties of its own state, and (3) uncertainties
about its reasoning process and execution abilities.
2.3 MDP-based Planning and Learning
e diversity of factors that inuence APS self-condence requires
a rich modeling approach for algorithmic assessment. We will
therefore establish algorithmic realizations of self-condence as-
sessments by initially studying APS capabilities that can be de-
ned or modeled via Markov decision processes (MDPs). MDPs
are composed of nite states and actions that partially resolve the
nondeterminism in the state transitions by deciding from what
probability distribution p(·) the next state will be sampled. e co-
existence of nondeterministic and stochastic choices in MDPs are
expressive enough to account for a range of uncertainties including
adversarial environmental factors and inaccuracies in execution.
Since MDPs also have well-established connections to other widely
used approaches for autonomous decision-making and learning
under uncertainty, such as partially observable MDPs (POMDPs)
for decision-making in limited observability environments and re-
inforcement learning for decision-making with incomplete model
information [14], they provide an ideal starting point for an initial
analysis of self-condence that can be generalized in future work.
More formally, we consider generic MDP formulations of a
task T delegated to an APS. In an MDP framing of T , the au-
tonomous agent must nd an optimal policy pi = u(x) for an
MDP with dynamical state x and actions u, such that the objec-
tive functionU = E
[∑∞
k=0 γ
ir (xk ,uk )
]
is maximized for all times
k = 0, ...,∞ – where R(xk ,uk ) rewards (penalizes) the APS for be-
ing in (un)desirable states and taking (un)desirable actions, E[·] is
the expected value over all possible future states, and γ ∈ (0, 1] is a
(tunable) future discount factor. Given any uk , the state xk updates
via a Markov probabilistic transition model xk+1 ∼ p(xk+1 |xk ,uk ),
i.e. xi is fully observed at time i (no sensor noise), while transitions
i → k+1 have random perturbations. In a fully posed MDP, pi is the
optimal state-action policy, which can be recovered from Bellman’s
equation via dynamic programming. However, in many practical
situations, policy approximations p˜i may still be required, e.g. to
cope with very large state dimensions or structured uncertainties
in the state transition distribution [14].
2.3.1 VIP Escort Example Application. Consider a concrete ground-
ing example problem based on the “VIP escort” scenario [10], which
serves as a useful proxy for security and surveillance applications
with unmanned robotic vehicles (see Fig. 1). An unmanned ground
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Figure 1: UGV in road network evading pursuer with infor-
mation from noisy UGS.
vehicle (UGV) leads a small convoy protecting a VIP through a road
network monitored by friendly unaended ground sensors (UGS).
e road network also contains a hostile pursuer that the UGV is
trying to evade while exiting the network as quickly as possible.
e pursuer’s location is unknown but can be estimated using in-
termient data from the UGS, which only sense portions of the
network and can produce false alarms. e UGV’s decision space
involves selecting a sequence of discrete actions (i.e. go straight,
turn le, turn right, go back, stay in place). e UGS data, UGV
motion, and pursuer behavior are all stochastic, and the problems
of decision making and sensing are strongly coupled: some trajec-
tories through the network allow the UGV to localize the pursuer
before heading to the exit but incur a high time penalty); other
trajectories aord rapid exit with high pursuer location uncertainty
but increase the risk of geing caught by the pursuer, which can
take multiple paths. A human supervisor monitors the UGV during
operation. e supervisor does not have detailed knowledge of the
UGV – but can interrogate its actions, as well as potentially modify
its decision making stance (‘aggressively pursue exit’ vs. ‘be very
conservative and cautious’) in order beer cope with the pursuer
(which is sporadically observed and follows an unknown course).
e physical states describing the combined motion of the UGV
(whose states are always perfectly observable) and pursuer can be
discretized in time and space to produce a Markov process model
dened by some initial joint state probability distribution and joint
state transition matrix, which depends on the steering actions taken
by the UGV. e probability of obtaining ‘detection’ and ‘no detec-
tion’ data from each UGS given the true state of the pursuer can be
modeled and used to update probabilistic beliefs about the state of
the chaser. Finally, a reward function R(xk ,uk ) = Rk can be speci-
ed for each time step k to encode user preferences over the com-
bined state of the UGV and pursuer, e.g. Rk = −1 for each time step
the UGV is not co-located with the pursuer but not yet at the exit,
Rk = −1000 if the UGV and pursuer are co-located, and Rk = +1000
if the UGV reaches the exit without geing caught. Given these
elements, the UGV’s navigational planning and decision-making
problem may be generally formulated as a POMDP. In special the
case where the pursuer’s state is fully observable at each step k (e.g.
due to very reliable and accurate UGS that cover all areas of the
road network), the problem reduces to an MDP.
3 SELF-CONFIDENCE FACTORIZATION AND
CALCULATION
is work seeks to develop algorithmic strategies for assessing
and communicating machine self-condence. Of particular interest
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Figure 2: Factorized Machine Self-Condence (FaMSeC)
are model-based techniques that endow an APS with a process-
driven scoring of how it arrives at decisions, and what factors
inuence the quality of its reasoning, in order to quantitatively
assess its own competency boundaries. As such, it is important
to formally establish both: (i) a set of principles, denitions, and
relations that govern the ‘arithmetic of machine self-condence’ as
a function of task, environment, system realization, and context,
and (ii) variables, representations and operations for producing
meaningful self-condence assessments.
We initially address these issues for APS that are primarily de-
ned by capabilities for dynamic decision-making and planning
under uncertainty. is approach provides a pathway to developing
rm initial mathematical and computational bases for addressing
(i) and (ii) via the rich set of analytical and computational features
inherent to the MDP model family. Aer reviewing a computational
framework for self-condence assessment that relies on assessing
individual factors involved with solving MDP-based planning and
decision-making problems, we consider how one of these factors
(related to the quality of a given MDP policy solver) can actually be
computed, building on insights derived from calculation and analy-
sis of another factor (related to intrinsic task diculty) examined
in other work.
3.1 e FaMSeC Framework
e approach presented here adopts and builds on the FactorizedMa-
chine Self-Condence (FaMSeC) framework developed in ref. [2, 3].
e key idea behind FaMSeC is to represent and compute self-
condence as a traceable multi-factor function, which combines
shorthand assessments of where and when operations and approx-
imations inherent to model-based autonomous decision-making
are expected to break down. As with the self-condence reporting
strategy developed in [11], this captures metrics than an expert
designer would use to assess the correctness and quality of an au-
tonomous decision-making system, accounting for variations in
task, environment, system implementation, and context. However,
unlike [11], FaMSeC allows an APS to automatically generate its
own holistic assessments of self-condence, i.e. without the need
for a human designer/expert to specify a priori how self-condent
a system ought to be given such variations
Figure 2 illustrates FaMSeC’s notional overall self-condence
scoring mechanism. is uses a set of self-condence factors (dashed
lines) that are derived from core algorithmic decision-making com-
ponents (white boxes in the ‘Autonomy’ block). e total self-
condence score can be mapped onto an arbitrary scale, e.g. -1 to
+1 for the sake of discussion, where -1 gives a shorthand indication
of ‘complete lack of condence’ (i.e. some aspect of task, environ-
ment, or context falls completely outside the system’s competency
boundaries), and +1 indicates ‘complete condence’ (i.e. all aspects
of task, environment, and mission context are well within system’s
competency boundaries). As will be shown later, the scales for
each factor need not all be the same and can carry slightly dierent
qualitative interpretations, as long as a clear sense of ‘condence
direction’ (i.e. degree of self-trust) can be established for each.
Ref. [2] considers ve general factors that contribute to a ‘total
self-condence score’, which notionally maps the multivariate the
combined set of individual factors into an overall condence report:
(1) xI—interpretation of user intent and task: To what
extent were the user’s intentions properly understood
and translated by the autonomous system into context-
appropriate mission specications and tasks? is factor
derives from features and parameters of the ‘Interpreter’
block. For instance, if a natural language interface is used
for mission planning, this factor could assess how well
user inputs are mapped to reward functions using xed
vocabularies for dierent mission proles.
(2) xM—model and data validity: Are the agent’s learned
and/or assumed models, and associated training data used
for decision-making good enough proxies for the real world?
is factor assesses how well the set of measurements and
events predicted by the autonomous system line up with
what it actually should observe in reality.
(3) xQ—solver quality: Are the approximations and learning-
based adaptations used by the system for solving decision-
making problems appropriate for the given mission and
model? Since approximations are almost always needed to
solve otherwise intractable decision making problems, this
factor examines the appropriateness and reliability of those
approximations. is factor also accounts for the impact of
learning mechanisms required to make complex decisions
under uncertainty, e.g. based on suitability of training data
or the learning process to solving the problem at hand.
(4) xO—expected outcome assessment: Do the sets of possi-
ble events, rewards, costs, utilities, etc. for a particular de-
cision lead to desirable outcomes? Even if the autonomous
system perfectly understands and analyzes a task, and can
arrive at globally optimal solutions, it may still not be able
to always avoid running into undesirable states along the
way. is factor evaluates the particular decision making
strategy implemented by the system to assess the inherent
favorability of the full landscape of possible task outcomes.
(5) xP—past history and experiences: What can be gleaned
from the system’s own experience and other available his-
torical information for past problem instances? is factor
notionally allows the autonomous system to predict, trans-
fer, and update assessments of self-condence based on
prior experiences, and thus embodies meta-memory and
meta-learning for enabling and improving self-assessments.
Since the overall self-condence mapping is heavily dependent
on application, context, and desired levels/types of user-autonomy
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Figure 3: Notional FaMSeC behaviors for VIP Escort prob-
lem with a hypothetical sampling-based solver.
interaction, this work assumes for simplicity that the overall map-
ping consists of a direct report of some xed subset of the com-
ponent factors, i.e. xSC={xI ,xM ,xQ ,xO ,xP}. Furthermore, the ve
factors considered here are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. For
example, the factors developed by [2, 3] are primarily aimed at
self-assessment prior to the execution of a particular task, whereas
it is conceivable that other self-condence factors could be included
to account for in situ and post hoc self-assessments. For simplicity,
aention is restricted to the a priori task self-assessment case.
3.1.1 VIP Escort Example Revisited. We will use the VIP Escort
scenario to examine two immediate questions: (i) how should the
factors be expected to behave under dierent conditions (indepen-
dently of how they are actually calculated)?, and (ii) how should
any one these factors actually be calculated?
To address (i), we should rst consider what kinds of trends,
‘boundary conditions’, and interactions are expected for the vari-
ous factors if we are given some class of solver for the underlying
UGV motion planning problem. For instance, if the problem were
modeled and encoded as a discrete-time/discrete-space MDP, then
sampling-based Monte Carlo solvers could be used to nd an ap-
proximately optimal policy pi [5], which would map joint UGV-
chaser state information onto specic UGV actions to maximize
the UGV’s expected cumulative reward. Figure 3 shows some ex-
pected behaviors for the FaMSeC factors for such a solver, as a
function of task, environment, system, and context, assuming again
an arbitrary nite range of -1 (total lack of condence) to +1 (com-
plete condence) for illustration only. For instance, xQ would be
expected to increase/decrease as the number of samples used by the
Monte Carlo solver to approximate pi increased/decreased. Similar
trends could also be derived for other non-sampling based solvers.
With this in mind, an important issue to consider for addressing
(ii) is that the factors can depend on each other in complex ways. A
logical simplifying assumption for initial algorithm development is
thus to consider cases where we can ignore the interactions between
factors; this is equivalent to examining each factor along ‘boundary
conditions’ where other factors do not change and thus have lit-
tle/no contribution to the overall self-condence score. For example,
ref. [2] developed an approach to compute xO for innite horizon
MDP and POMDP planning, assuming the boundary conditions
xM= +1 (perfectly known problem/task model), xI= +1 (perfectly
interpreted user task command and reward function Rk ), xQ= +1
(optimal policy pi known and available), and xP= +1 (task encoun-
tered previously). Under these conditions, overall self-condence
Figure 4: Example xO assessments for VIP Escort problem in
various task environments, using UPM/LPM score from [2]
on empirically sampled p(R∞) pdfs.
depends only on xO , which can then be quantied as a measure
of the probability distribution ppi (R∞) of achievable cumulative
reward values R∞ =
∑∞
k=0 Rk under policy pi . Ref. [2] considers
several measures of ppi (R∞), including the logistically transformed
upper partial moment/lower partial moment (UPM/LPM) score,
which quanties how much probability mass lies to the right vs.
le of a minimally acceptable cumulative reward value R∗∞ (e.g. in
the basic VIP Escort problem, this corresponds to a user-specied
maximum acceptable time to successfully reach the exit).
By indicating how likely favorable outcomes are expected rela-
tive to unfavorable outcomes according to a baseline performance
measure R∗∞, self-condence measures like the UPM/LPM score
provides information about the consequences of applying policy pi
to a task by interpreting the full shape of the cumulative reward
distribution ppi (R∞), i.e. beyond just the mean value of R∞ (which
the optimal pi maximizes) or the variance/entropy of ppi (R∞). As
illustrated in Fig. 4 this allows xO to be used as a second-order un-
certainty measure for assessing intrinsic task diculty—and hence
indicates a measure of APS competency that can be reported to
users to calibrate their trust.
Since ref. [2] does not specify how to compute other factors, nor
how to cope with interdependencies between factors that will arise
when assumptions such as those above are relaxed, it is natural to
consider how these insights extend to computation and analysis of
other FaMSeC factors. For instance, what does information related
to the assessment of xO tell us about how other factors should be
assessed? In particular, since xO indirectly depends on xQ , we next
consider how to use p(R∞) to also derive a metric for xQ . Namely,
if we consider that an MDP-based APS must in practice oen rely
on an approximate policy p˜i instead of the true optimal policy pi ,
then a quantitative comparison of pp˜i (R∞) to ppi (R∞) provides a
metric for xQ . e remainder of this paper explores how strategies
for assessing xQ along these lines (under the progressively relaxed
assumption of xM=+1, xP=+1, and xI =+1).
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3.2 Solverality (xQ )
e main aim of xQ is to indicate how a solver S will perform on a
given (possibly un-encountered) task T of a given class cT (i.e. all
road networks with a UGV, Pursuer, and exit, et cetera as described
previously). e need for xQ is not necessarily easy to understand;
an analogy helps to clarify:
Clarifying Example: One could informally think of xQ as an
indication of the ability of an athlete. is is opposed to the athlete’s
assessment of the desirability of the outcome of a game (xO ). While
an athlete may be very capable (high xQ ), the score of the game
may be such that the athlete knows that it is nearly impossible
to catch up and win the game (low xO ). Conversely, an athlete
may not be very capable (low xQ ), and due to being naı¨ve has an
incorrect assessment of the desirability of the outcome (xO cannot
be trusted).
e formal desiderata for xQ are:
D1 reect competence of solver S for task T (where com-
petence is analogous to the ‘ability’ of the athlete in the
example)
D2 enable comparison across solver classes
D3 extend to unseen tasks of the same class cT
For practical application, it is critical to be able to compare the
quality of solvers of dierent classes (i.e. exact vs. approximate)
because there are many dierent ways of solving tasks. Likewise,
it is also common for an APS to encounter a similar, but previously
unseen, task (i.e. a dierent road network).
Evaluating the ‘quality’ of something implies some kind of com-
parison is taking place. In this seing the desired comparison is
between a ‘candidate solver’ S and some reference solver. Ideally,
the candidate solver could be compared to the exact solution (whose
quality is by denition perfect), but there are three main challenges:
C1 It is unclear how policies/solvers should be compared
C2 Large state spaces make exact solutions infeasible
C3 It is generally impossible to evaluate the exact solution for
all tasks of a given task class cT (linked to D3)
3.2.1 Addressing C1. Solvers of all classes are similar in that
they operate on a specied problem in order to produce a policy pi
that is a mapping from states to actions with the aim of maximizing
expected reward. A few possibilities for comparing policies include:
(1) Compare utilities at each state
• Merits: Evaluates whether states are assigned equal
utility across solvers. eoretically state utilities should
be independent of the solver. Addresses D1
• Demerits: Doesn’t address D2—Doesn’t apply when
dierent solvers represent dierent amounts of the
state space, or represent the state space dierently.
(2) Compare ‘coverage’ of the policy (here coverage refers to
the proportion of the total state space considered by the
solver)
• Merits: Evaluates how ‘thorough’ the policy is; in
concert with 1 could address D1
• Demerits: Doesn’t satisfy D2—not all policies have
the same coverage, typically by design. Also, high
coverage does not imply a ‘good’ solution
(3) Compare the reward distribution of given policies
rH
rL
∆µrH−rL
x
R
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d
T∼(µT ,σT )
C∼(µC ,σC)
SurrogateM∗(T )
Training Data
Trusted
Candidate
Figure 5: Key values involved in calculating xQ , where x rep-
resents a ‘parameter of interest’ for task T , or solver S.
• Merits: Meets D1, also able to satisfy D2 as reward
distributions can be simulated from any policy
• Demerits: Expensive to calculate the reward distribu-
tion via many simulations
Of the possibilities listed above, item 3 will be used because only
it is able to satisfy D1 and D2.
3.2.2 Addressing C2, and C3. In order to address C2 a ‘trusted
solver’ S∗ could be introduced as the reference to which the candi-
date solver S can be compared. is solver need not be exact (but
could be). Ultimately, S∗ is only required to be a reference of some
kind; it may be optimal, or it may be abysmal. In fact given a space
of all possible unseen tasks of class cT , S∗ will likely perform very
poorly for some of them.
Still, according to C3, it is impractical, or impossible, to nd
an exact solution for all tasks task class notation. Literature on
‘Empirical Hardness Models’ (EHMs) lends some direction for con-
fronting this challenge. In their work [12, 17] introduced EHMs in
order to predict the empirical runtime performance (as opposed
to the ‘Big-O’ runtime) of an algorithm on a problem with given
features. Specically, they investigate how the actual runtime of
NP-complete problems can be predicted. Applying similar logic
in the domain of APS, it should be possible to learn a surrogate
modelM∗(T ) that predicts the reward distribution R˜∗ of a trusted
solver S∗ for a given task T of class cT . In this way it is possible to
estimate the performance of S∗ on problems to which it has never
been applied. is approach also addresses D3.
3.2.3 Summary. e comparison of policies will be done through
comparing reward distributions; this approach addresses both D1
and D2, along with C1. In order to address C2, C3, and D3 a
‘trusted solver’ S∗ will be introduced to serve as a basis by which
a ‘candidate solver’ S can be evaluated. Furthermore, a surrogate
modelM∗(T ) will be learned to predict R˜∗ on un-encountered
tasks. In this way, all desiderata, and challenges have been ad-
dressed.
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(a) Oline Training
(b) Online Deployment
Figure 6: Depiction of the training phase of the surrogate
functionM∗(T ), and the test, or online deployment, phase
where xQ is calculated.
4 METHODOLOGY
How, then, can xQ be calculated? Following from discussion in
the previous section, a surrogate modelM∗(T ) can be learned to
predict the reward distribution R˜∗ of the trusted reference solver
S∗ on task T as shown in Fig. 6a.
e candidate solver S must then be evaluated w.r.t. the trusted
solverS∗. is is done by comparing R˜∗ (the predicted performance
of S∗ on task T ) and R (the simulated performance of solver S on
task T ) as illustrated in Fig. 6b.
Figure 5 illustrates some of the key quantities involved in cal-
culating xQ . e basic premise is: nd the dierence between the
trusted (T ) and candidate (C) solvers while taking into account the
overall range of rewards of the trusted solver over many tasks.
4.1 LearningM∗(T )
e surrogate model M∗(T ) can be any model capable of pre-
dicting R˜∗ given T . In the formulation presented above R˜∗i only
represents the mean and standard deviation for R∗i (this makes the
learning problem less complicated, but is not necessary). Figure
6a depicts how the surrogate model is trained. LearningM∗(T )
would typically be done ‘oine’ and in a supervised manner when
more computation power and time are available. LaterM∗(T ) can
be deployed for use on an APS.
4.2 Calculating xQ
In order to compare two solvers the resultant reward distributions
that each of those solvers produce are compared. If two solvers
produce an identical reward distribution for a given task, then they
can be considered equal in their ‘quality’, or considered equally
‘capable’. Conversely, if the two distributions are very dierent for
the same task, then their quality, or capability, is also dierent.
4.2.1 Hellinger Metric H2. Perhaps the easiest way of calcu-
lating the similarity between distributions is to nd the ‘distance’
between them, the Hellinger metric (H2) is such a measure. It is
bounded between 0 and 1, where 0 means the distributions are
identical. e maximum distance, 1, is achieved when one distri-
bution P assigns zero probability at every point in which another
distribution Q assigns probability. H2 has dierent forms based
on the type of analytical distributions being compared. For the
purposes of calculating xQ from two distributions P ∼ (µ1,σ1) and
Q ∼ (µ2,σ2) the following form is useful:
H2(P ,Q) = 1 −
√
2σPσQ
σ 2P + σ
2
Q
exp
(
−14
(µP − µQ )2
σ 2P + σ
2
Q
)
(1)
Using H2 the overlap between T and C can be calculated. How-
ever, there are a couple of other considerations that need to be
taken into account.
4.2.2 Dierence in Expected Reward: ∆µ. H2 as a distance mea-
sure is always greater than zero, and so information that indicates if
a distribution is generally beer or worse (i.e. more or less expected
reward) is lost. In order to keep this information the sign of the
dierence between the expected rewards of the two distributions
sgn(µ1 − µ2) can be used.
4.2.3 Global Scale: (rH − rL). e next consideration is that
just because distance between two distributions may be great or
small, does not mean the same applies from a higher-level, or global,
perspective. In an extreme case one might imagine two Normal
distributions with means µ1 = 1 and µ2 = 2, and low variances
σ 21 = σ
2
2 = 1e-5. In this case the Hellinger distance between the two
would be 1 since they share practically no overlapping probability.
However, if the means of the distributions are nearly equal on the
global scale (e.g. rewards from many other training tasks are on the
range [−1e3, 1e3]), then the quantity of H2 isn’t the critical factor.
4.2.4 Puing the pieces together. Using the points discussed
above the expression for the quality of candidate solver S w.r.t. the
reference solver S∗ is (again see Fig. 5 for intuition):
q = sgn(∆µ)f α
√
H2(T ,C) (2)
Where ∆µ = µc − µt , and f = ∆µ/(rH − rL). e exponent α is
a parameter that aects the inuence that f has with respect to H2.
In essence, should the relationship of the eects of f and H2 be
1 : 1? In practice α = 1 does not yield desirable results. H2 should
be more inuential on q as f grows smaller, and f should be more
inuential as it increases. We have found α = 1/2 gives results that
‘make sense’; future work could investigate the ‘best’ value for α
via user studies.
4.2.5 Accommodations For Humans. While H2 is on the domain
[0, 1], the quantity f is [0,∞]. Because of this it is desirable to
use a ‘squashing function’ to keep the reported xQ value within
some bounded range and avoid arbitrarily large values that can
be confusing to humans. e general logistic equation is useful
for this. e numerator is 2 so that when q = 0 (distributions are
identical) xQ will be 1. Dividing the quantity q by 5 so makes it so
that xQ ‘saturates’ at around q = ±1.
xQ =
2
1 + exp(−q/5) (3)
4.3 Examples
A toy example is useful in evaluating whether xQ yields desirable
results. Figure 7 illustrates a such an example, depicting the ex-
pected reward (with uncertainty) for a trusted solver S∗ given a
specic, generic, task/solver parameter, as well as that of a ‘can-
didate’ solver S. Dierent points of interest (indicating specic
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A B C D
xQ(r=5.0) 0.998 0.667 1.095 1.351
xQ(r=0.5) 0.994 0.215 1.291 1.821
xQ(r=0.05) 0.981 0.002 1.739 1.999
xQ(r=0.005) 0.940 0.000 1.995 2.000
Figure 7: Assessing xQ calculation on reward fxn’s: S∗ (blue)
and S (red). Points of interest indicated by a star.
values of the task parameter) are highlighted by a star. e table
on the side shows the values of xQ calculated for dierent cases.
At B the candidate solver has a lower expected reward than
the trusted solver and a higher variance than the trusted solver.
Intuitively xQ should be less than one. As shown when r = 5 (i.e.
rH − rL = 5, the global reward range is ‘large’) xQ = 0.667 which
indicates that the candidate solver is marginally less capable than
the trusted solver, and when r = 0.05 then xQ = 0.002 indicates
that S is much less capable than S∗.
At C the candidate solver S has higher expected reward than
S∗, but a larger variance. Intuitively we would expect xQ of S to
be a lile greater than one, and in fact when r = 5, xQ = 1.095.
As the global reward range r decreases the dierence in capability
between S and S∗ increases with xQ = 1.995 at r = 0.005. ese
calculations indicate that xQ performs as expected. In Sec. 5 a more
realistic scenario is considered.
5 RESULTS
In order to investigate how xQ performs on a more realistic sce-
nario the VIP escort problem introduced in Sec. 2.3.1 will be used.
While the original problem is dened as a POMDP, here we investi-
gate a somewhat simpler version of the problem, and instead use
fully observable MDPs. is is reasonable because xQ operates
on reward distributions, which are produced by policies on any
decision making problem. e benet of using MDPs is that they
are computationally less burdensome than POMDPs, while still
being capable of being applied to complex decision problems.
In order to nd a policy for the MDP, a Monte-Carlo Tree Search
(MCTS) solver will be used [5]. As the name suggests MCTS in-
volves building a tree from the starting state of the UGV and simu-
lating a specied number of actions/transitions into the future in
order to calculate the utility of each state. is process is repeated
many times, and the utilities of each state are updated aer each
iteration. e actions selected by MCTS are based not only on
the current utility of the state, but an exploration parameter that
helps ensure that the search doesn’t simply exploit the greatest
known utilities. An MCTS solver is convenient to use during these
experiments because the quality of the solver can be easily changed
by modifying the parameters.
e road network is represented as shown in Fig. 8a. e UGV
begins at the yellow node (node 1), the pursuer begins at the red
node (node 4), and the desired exit is indicated by the green node
(node 13). e problem is dened by the parameters listed in Table 1
(a) Road network N=13 (b) Road network N=45
Figure 8: Example road networks. UGV starts at yellow, Pur-
suer beings at red, and the exit is green.
Table 1: Table of parameters: simplied VIP escort problem
Parameter Description
ptrans e transition probability of the UGV. is is the probability that
the UGV will move in the desired direction when aempting to
move. ere is a probability of 1 − tp rob that it will go to a
dierent neighboring cell.
d MDP discount factor
N e number of nodes included in the road
emcts e exploration constant parameter of the MCTS.
dmcts e depth of the MCTS tree
itsmcts e number of Monte-Carlo simulations to run to nd the policy
rwdexit e reward for the UGV successfully exiting the road network
rwdcauдht e reward for the UGV being caught by the pursuer
rwdsense e reward for making a movement
ree separate evaluations were completed. First, xQ was calcu-
lated for MCTS solvers with varying depth parameters (all others
held constant). Second, xQ was evaluated for a candidate solver
with varying task parameters. Finally, xQ was evaluated for a
candidate solver with varying task and solver parameters.
5.1 Varying A Solver Parameter
is evaluation involved experiments 1 and 2 from Table 2. MCTS
Solvers of varying depths were used to nd solutions to each of
the two networks. In each case one of the solvers was chosen as
the trusted one (i.e. chose a ‘good’ solver). In the case of exper-
iment 1 S∗ was the dmcts = 9 solver, and in experiment 2 S∗
was the dmcts = 25 solver. A surrogateM∗(T ) was not used for
this evaluation, instead R∗ was calculated directly and used for
comparison.
e results for experiment 1 are shown in Fig. 9a. As expected
xQ between S∗ and itself is 1.0. We see that candidate solvers
depth 6 through 10 are about equivalent to S∗ (and each other),
which indicates they are similarly capable of solving the problem.
Whereas candidate solvers with depth 1 through 3 are much less
capable than the trusted solver.
e results of experiment 2 are shown in Fig. 9b, where S∗ with
dmcts = 5 has been selected. According to the plot only solvers
of depth 22, and 28 have similar capability to S∗. Note, that the
dmcts = 1 solver has xQ = 0.83, this is most possibly due to the fact
that the depth 1 solver will make decisions based on lile foresight,
while solver with depths from 4 to 19 have enough foresight to
hesitate and accumulate negative rewards from not moving quickly.
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Table 2: Parameters used for the dierent experiments
Parameters
# Variable(s) Network ptrans d N emcts dmcts itsmcts rwdexit rwdcauдht rwdsense
1 dmcts Fig. 8a 0.7 0.90 13 [1000.0] [1 : 1 : 10] 100 2000 -2000 -200
2 dmcts Fig. 8b 0.7 0.95 45 [2000.0] [1 : 3 : 28] 1000 2000 -2000 -200
3 ptrans Fig. 8a [0.0, 1.0] 0.95 13 [1000.0] [8, 3, 1] 1000 2000 -2000 -100
4 ptrans , emcts Fig. 8a [0.0, 1.0] 0.95 13 [10.0, 1000.0] [8, 3, 1] 1000 2000 -2000 -100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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2500
0
2500
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wa
rd
SQ: 0.41 SQ: 0.42
SQ: 0.78
SQ: 0.92 SQ: 0.96
SQ: 1.00 SQ: 0.99 SQ: 0.99 SQ: 1.00 SQ: 1.01
Reward vs. MCTS Depth
(a) Experiment 1
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0
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SQ: 0.83
SQ: 0.44 SQ: 0.37 SQ: 0.43 SQ: 0.48
SQ: 0.62 SQ: 0.64
SQ: 0.91
SQ: 1.00
SQ: 1.08
Reward vs. MCTS Depth
(b) Experiment 2
Figure 9: Experiment results. xQ is calculated w.r.t S∗ high-
lighted in blue.
An important insight is that while the dmcts = 9 solver is very
capable of solving the small network from Fig. 8a, that perfor-
mance does not extend to the medium sized network from Fig. 8b.
e dmcts = 7 and 10 solvers are very incapable compared to the
trusted solver of dmcts = 25, this is reected by the value of xQ .
5.2 Varying A Task Parameter
Experiment 3 was used for this evaluation, where S∗ is a depth 8
solver, while the two candidate solvers were depth 3 and depth 1.
e surrogate modelM∗(T ) was learned using two generic deep
neural networks with three hidden layers. One network to learn
to predict the mean reward, and the other to predict the standard
deviation (M∗(T ) here uses the output of two models). In a fairly
simple problem such as this one a DNN of this conguration is likely
overkill, but it demonstrates the possibility of using an arbitrarily
complex black box model forM∗(T ).
Figure 10a shows the results forSwithdmcts = 3 at two dierent
values of ptrans . At ptrans = 0.25 S is slightly more capable than
S∗. Whereas, at ptrans = 0.75 S is slightly less capable.
Figure 10b shows the results for the candidate solver withdmcts =
1 at two dierent values of ptrans . At ptrans = 0.25 the candidate
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(b) S depth 1
Figure 10: Comparison of S to S∗ of depth 8.
solver is moderately less capable than the trusted solver. Whereas,
at ptrans = 0.75 the candidate solver is slightly much less capable.
ese values correspond to expected behavior of xQ .
5.3 Varying Task and Solver Parameters
Experiment 4 was used for this evaluation, where S∗ is a depth
8 solver, while the two candidate solvers were depth 3 and depth
1. Both ptrans and emcts were variable for the experiments. e
results are found in Figs. 11a and 11b. e surrogateM∗(T ) used
here is the same as in the previous evaluation (i.e. two DNNs to
predict mean and standard deviation).
Figure 11a shows the results forSwithdmcts = 3 at two dierent
points of interest. At A S is slightly less capable than S∗, xQ is
similar at B as well.
Figure 11b shows the results for S with dmcts = 1 at two dif-
ferent points of interest. At A S is slightly more capable than S∗.
Whereas, at B S is moderately worse than S∗.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Unmanned autonomous physical systems are able to tackle complex
decision making problems for high-consequence applications, but in
order to be able to reduce the amount of supervision required these
systems need to be able to perform self-assessment, or introspection.
We draw on Factorized Machine Self-Condence (FaMSeC) which is
a framework of self-assessments that enable an APS to quantify its
own capabilities.
Specically, herein, we have motivated and derived a one of the
factors of FaMSeC called ‘Solver ality’ (xQ ) that indicates the
ability of some solver to perform on a given task. Calculating xQ
relies only on a supervised model of a trusted solver, and simulated
reward distributions of candidate solvers. is approach was in-
spired by literature on empirical hardness models (EHMs). We have
shown by numerical experiments that xQ , as derived here, meets
the desired criteria.
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Figure 11: Comparison of S to S∗ of depth 8. e top-le
shows the mean reward of S∗, the bottom-le is the std. of
S∗. Figures on RHS show xQ (SQ) at points A, and B.
Concerning xQ , it remains to be seen, and is currently le for
future work, whether it actually helps users to be able to understand
the capabilities and limitations of the APS. Evaluations with human
participants are required.
e simulations run so far have not directly considered ‘dierent
classes’ of solvers, however as xQ only depends on reward distribu-
tions R, and R∗ this is not a limitation. Also, since the calculation
of xQ generally depends on R∗ predicted fromM∗(T ) it would be
prudent to enable the surrogate to predict R∗ as well as an associ-
ated uncertainty in order to have an indication of whereM∗(T )
can be trusted.
Another direction for future work is to develop approaches for
the remaining three FaMSeC factors. Each of the individual factors
reects a critical meta-assessment of the competency of the APS.
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